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Corporate Distress Prediction Models in a Turbulent Economic and Basel II 
Environment 
 
Edward I. Altman 
 
 This paper discusses two of the primary motivating influences on the recent 
development/revisions of credit scoring models, - the important implications of 
Basel II’s proposed capital requirements on credit assets and the enormous amounts 
and rates of defaults and bankruptcies in the United States in 2001-2002.  Two of 
the more prominent credit scoring techniques, our Z-Score and KMV’s EDF 
models, are reviewed.  Both models are assessed with respect to default probabilities 
in general and in particular to the infamous Enron and WorldCom debacles in 
particular.  In order to be effective, these and other credit risk models should be 
utilized by firms with a sincere credit risk culture, observant of the fact that they 
are best used as an additional tool, not the sole decision making criteria, in the 
credit and security analyst process. 
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1. Introduction 
 Around the turn of the new century, credit scoring models have been remotivated 
and given unprecedented significance by the stunning pronouncements of the new Basel 
Accord on credit risk capital adequacy - - the so-called Basel II (see Basel [1999] and 
[2001]).  Banks, in particular, and most financial institutions worldwide, have either 
recently developed or modified existing internal credit risk systems or are currently 
developing methods to conform with best practice systems and processes for assessing 
the probability of default (PD) and, possibly, loss-given-default (LGD) on credit assets of 
all types.  Coincidentally, defaults and bankruptcies reached unprecedented levels in the 
United States in 2001 and have continued at even higher levels in 2002.  Indeed, 
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companies that filed for bankruptcy/reorganization under Chapter 11 with greater than 
$100 million liabilities reached at least $240 billion in liabilities in 2001, even with 
Enron’s understatement at the time of filing (see Figure 1).  And there were 39 firms in 
2001 that filed for protection under the US bankruptcy code with liabilities greater than 
$1 billion!  The pace of these large bankruptcies has continued in 2002 with another 25 
firms of such great size filing in the first eight months.  In the public bond arena, over 
$63 billion of U.S. domestic public, high yield (below investment grade) bonds defaulted 
in 2001 and the default rate was almost a record 9.8% (dollar weighted).  In addition, in 
only the first eight months of 2002, the corporate high yield bond default rate rose above 
12.0%, powered by 258 defaulting issues from 69 companies, including the largest 
default in history, WorldCom.1 
                                                 
1 Data is derived from the NYU Salomon Center corporate bond default and bankruptcy databases. 
FIGURE 1
TOTAL LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC COMPANIES FILING
FOR CHAPTER 11 PROTECTION
1989-2002 YTD*
    Note:    8/31/2002 only. Minimum $100 million in liabilities
    Source: NYU Salomon Center Bankrupcty Filings Database
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
$ 
B
ill
io
n 
0
40
80
120
160
200
Pre- Petition Liabilities, in $ billions (left axis)
Number of Filings (right axis)
Through August 2002
86 filings and pre-petitiion 
liabilities of $194.2 billion
2001
171 filings and pre-petition 
liabilities of $229.8 billion
This paper discusses a model developed by the author over 30 years ago, the Z-
Score model, and its relevance to these recent developments.  In doing so, we will 
provide some updated material on the Z-Score model’s tests and applications over time as 
well as two modifications for greater applicability.  We also discuss another widely used 
credit risk model, known as the KMV approach, and compare both KMV and Z-Score in 
the now infamous Enron (2001) and WorldCom bankruptcy debacles.  The paper is not 
meant to be a comparison of all of the well known and readily available credit scoring 
models, such as Moody’s RiskCalc®, CreditSight’s BondScore®, the Kamakura 
approach, or the ZETA® scoring model.  Finally, we summarize a recent report (Altman, 
Brady, Resti and Sironi, [2002]) on the association between aggregate PD and recovery 
rates on defaulted credit assets. 
 A major theme of this paper is that the assignment of appropriate default 
probabilities on corporate credit assets is a three-step process involving the sequential use 
of: 
(1) credit scoring models, 
(2) capital market risk equivalents - - usually bond ratings, and  
(3) assignment of PD and possibly LGDs on the credit portfolio.2   
Our emphasis will be on step (1) and how the Z-Score model, (Altman, 1968), has 
become the prototype model for one of the three primary structures for determining PDs.  
The other two credit scoring structures involve either the bond rating process itself or 
option pricing capital market valuation techniques, typified by the KMV expected default 
                                                 
2 Some might argue that a statistical methodology can combine steps (1) and (2) where the output from (1) 
automatically provides estimates of PD.  This is one of the reasons that many “modelers” of late and major 
consulting firms prefer the logit-regression approach, rather than the discriminant model that this author 
prefers.  
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frequency (EDF) approach, (McQuown [1993], Kealhofer [2000], and KMV [2000]).  
These techniques are also the backbone of most credit asset value-at-risk (VaR) models.  
In essence, we feel strongly that if the initial credit scoring model is sound and based on 
comprehensive and representative data, then the credit VaR model has a chance to be 
accurate and helpful for both regulatory and economic capital assignment and, of course, 
for distress prediction.  If it is not, no amount of quantitative sophistication or portfolio 
analytic structures can achieve valid credit risk results. 
2. Credit Scoring Models 
 Almost all of the statistical credit scoring models that are in use today are 
variations on a similar theme.  They involve the combination of a set of quantifiable 
financial indicators of firm performance with, perhaps, a small number of additional 
variables that attempt to capture some qualitative elements of the credit process.  
Although, this paper will concentrate on the quantitative measures, mainly financial 
ratios and capital market values, one should not underestimate the importance of 
qualitative measures in the process.3  Starting in the 1980’s, some practitioners, and 
certainly many academicians, had been moving toward the possible elimination of ratio 
analysis as an analytical technique in assessing firm performance.  Theorists have 
downgraded arbitrary rules of thumb (such as company ratio comparisons) that are 
widely used by practitioners.  Since attacks on the relevance of ratio analysis emanate 
from many esteemed members of the scholarly world, does this mean that ratio analysis 
is limited to the world of “nuts and bolts?”  Or, has the significance of such an approach 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3 Banking practitioners have reported that these so-called qualitative elements, that involve judgment on the 
part of the risk officer, can provide as much as 30-50% of the explanatory power of the scoring model. 
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been unattractively garbed and therefore unfairly handicapped?  Can we bridge the gap, 
rather than sever the link, between traditional ratio analysis and the more rigorous 
statistical techniques that have become popular among academicians?   
3. Traditional Ratio Analysis 
 The detection of company operating and financial difficulties is a subject which 
has been particularly amenable to analysis with financial ratios.  Prior to the development 
of quantitative measures of company performance, agencies had been established to 
supply a qualitative type of information assessing the creditworthiness of particular 
merchants.  (For instance, the forerunner of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. was organized in 
1849 in order to provide independent credit investigations).  
 Classic works in the area of ratio analysis and bankruptcy classification were 
performed by Beaver (1967, 1968).  His univariate analysis of a number of bankruptcy 
predictors set the stage for the multivariate attempts, by this author and others, which 
followed.  Beaver found that a number of indicators could discriminate between matched 
samples of failed and nonfailed firms for as long as five years prior to failure.  However, 
he questioned the use of multivariate analysis.  The Z-Score model, developed by this 
author at the same time (and published in 1968), that Beaver was working on his own 
thesis, did just that - constructed a multivariate model. 
 The aforementioned studies imply a definite potential of ratios as predictors of 
bankruptcy.  In general, ratios measuring profitability, liquidity, leverage, and solvency 
seemed to prevail as the most significant indicators.  The order of their importance is not 
clear since almost every study cited a different ratio as being the most effective indicator 
of impending problems.  An appropriate extension of the previously cited studies, 
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therefore, was to build upon their findings and to combine several measures into a 
meaningful predictive model.  However, several questions remained: 
(1)  which ratios are most important in detecting credit risk problems?  
(2) what weights should be attached to those selected ratios? 
(3)  how should the weights be objectively established? 
4. Discriminant Analysis 
 After careful consideration of the nature of the problem and of the purpose of this 
analysis, we chose multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) in our original constructions, as 
the appropriate statistical technique.  Although not as popular as regression analysis, 
MDA had been utilized in a variety of disciplines since its first application in the 
biological sciences in 1930’s.  MDA is a statistical technique used to classify an 
observation into one of several a priori groupings dependent upon the observation’s 
individual characteristics.  It is used primarily to classify/or make predictions in problems 
where the dependent variable appears in qualitative from, for example, male or female, 
bankrupt or nonbankrupt.  Therefore, the first step is to establish explicit group 
classifications.  The number of original groups can be two or more.  After the groups are 
established, data are collected for the objects in the groups. MDA in its most simple form 
attempts to derive a linear combination of these characteristics that “best” discriminates 
between the groups.  The technique has the advantage of considering an entire profile of 
characteristics common to the relevant firms, as well as the interaction of these 
properties.  
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5. Development of the Z-Score Model 
Sample Selection 
 The initial sample was composed of 66 corporations with 33 firms in each of the 
two groups: bankrupt and non-bankrupt.  The bankrupt (distressed) group were all 
manufacturers that filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter X of the National 
Bankruptcy Act from 1946 through 1965.  A 20-year sample period is not the best choice 
since average ratios do shift over time.  Ideally, we would prefer to examine a list of 
ratios in time period t in order to make predictions about other firms in the following 
period (t+1).  Unfortunately, because of data limitations at that time, it was not possible 
to do this.  Recent “heavy” activity of bankruptcies now presents a more fertile 
environment.  Recognizing that this group is not completely homogeneous (due to 
industry and size differences), we made a careful selection of nonbankrupt 
(nondistressed) firms.  This group consists of a paired sample of manufacturing firms 
chosen on a stratified random basis.  The firms are stratified by industry and by size, with 
the asset size range between $1 and $25 million.  Yes, in those days $25 million was 
considered a very large bankruptcy!  The data collected were from the same years as 
those compiled for the bankrupt firms.  For the initial sample test, the data are derived 
from financial statements that are dated one annual reporting period prior to bankruptcy.  
Some analysts, e.g., Shumway (2002), have criticized this “static” type of analysis, but 
we have found that the one-financial-statement-prior-to-distress structure yields the most 
accurate post-model building test results. 
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Variable Selection and Weightings 
 After the initial groups were defined and firms selected, balance sheet and income 
statement data were collected.  Because of the large number of variables that are 
potentially significant indicators of corporate problems, a list of 22 potentially helpful 
variables (ratios) were compiled for evaluation.  From the original list, five were selected 
as doing the best overall job together in the prediction of corporate bankruptcy.  The 
contribution of the entire profile is evaluated and, since this process is essentially 
iterative, there is no claim regarding the optimality of the resulting discriminant function. 
 The final discriminant function is given in Figure 2.  Note that the model does not 
contain a constant term.4  One of the most frequently asked questions is: “How did you 
determine the coefficients or weights?”  These weights are objectively determined by the 
computer algorithm and not by the analyst.  As such, they will be different if the sample 
changes or if new variables are utilized. 
 
 
 Figure 2 
The Z-Score Model 
 
                 Z = 1.2 X1 + 1.4 X2 + 3.3 X3 + 0.6 X4  + 1.0 X5 
                              
                   X1 = working capital/total assets, 
                X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
                X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
                X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, 
                X5 = sales/total assets, and 
                  Z = overall Index or Score 
Source:  Altman (1968) 
                                                 
4 This is due to the particular software utilized and, as a result, the relevant cutoff score between the two 
groups is not zero.  Many statistical software programs now have a constant term, which standardizes the 
cutoff score at zero if the sample sizes of the two groups are equal. 
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X1, Working Capital/Total Asset (WC/TA) 
 The working capital/total assets ratio is a measure of the net liquid assets of the 
firm relative to the total capitalization.  Working capital is defined as the difference 
between current assets and current liabilities.  Liquidity and size characteristics are 
explicitly considered.  This ratio was the least important contributor to discrimination 
between the two groups.  In all cases, tangible assets, not including intangibles, are used. 
X2, Retained Earnings/Total Assets (RE/TA) 
 Retained earnings (RE) is the total amount of reinvested earnings and/or losses of 
a firm over its entire life.  The account is also referred to as earned surplus. This is a 
measure of cumulative profitability over time.  The age of a firm is implicitly considered 
in this ratio.  It is likely that a bias would be created by a substantial reorganization or 
stock dividend and appropriate readjustments should, in the event of this happening, be 
made to the accounts. 
 In addition, the RE/TA ratio measures the leverage of a firm.  Those firms with 
high RE relative to TA have financed their assets through retention of profits and have 
not utilized as much debt.  This ratio highlights either the use of internally generated 
funds for growth (low risk capital) vs. OPM (other people’s money) - higher risk capital.   
X3, Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets (EBIT/TA) 
 This is a measure of the productivity of the firm’s assets, independent of any tax 
or leverage factors.  Since a firm’s ultimate existence is based on the earning power of its 
assets, this ratio appears to be particularly appropriate for studies dealing with credit risk.   
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X4, Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities (MVE/TL) 
 Equity is measured by the combined market value of all shares of stock, preferred 
and common, while liabilities include both current and long term.  The measure shows 
how much the firm’s assets can decline in value (measured by market value of equity 
plus debt) before the liabilities exceed the assets and the firm becomes insolvent.  We 
discussed this “comparison” long before the advent of the KMV approach (which I will 
discuss shortly) - that is, before Merton [1974] put these relationships into an option-
theoretic approach to value corporate risky debt.  KMV used Merton’s work to 
springboard into its now commonly used credit risk measure - the Expected Default 
Frequency (EDF). 
 This ratio adds a market value dimension that most other failure studies did not 
consider.  At a later point, we will substitute the book value of net worth for the market 
value in order to derive a discriminant function for privately held firms (Z’) and for non-
manufacturers (Z”). 
X5, Sales/Total Assets (S/TA) 
 The capital-turnover ratio is a standard financial ratio illustrating the sales 
generating ability of the firm’s assets.  Net sales is used.  It is a measure of management’s 
capacity to deal with competitive conditions.  This final ratio is unique because it is the 
least significant ratio and, on a univariate statistical significance test basis, it would not 
have appeared at all.  However, because of its relationship to other variables in the model, 
the sales/total assets (S/TA) ratio ranks high in its contribution to the overall 
discriminating ability of the model.  Still, there is a wide variation among industries and 
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across countries in asset turnover, and we will specify an alternative model (Z”), without 
X5, at a later point. 
 Variables and their averages were measured at one financial statement prior to 
bankruptcy and the resulting F-statistics were observed; variables X1 through X4 are all 
significant at the 0.001 level, indicating extremely significant differences between 
groups.  Variable X5 does not show a significant difference between groups.  On a strictly 
univariate level, all of the ratios indicate higher values for the nonbankrupt firms and the 
discriminant coefficients display positive signs, which is what one would expect.  
Therefore, the greater a firm’s distress potential, the lower its discriminant score.  
Although it was clear that four of the five variables displayed significant differences 
between groups, the importance of MDA is its ability to separate groups using 
multivariate measures. 
 Once the values of the discriminant coefficients are estimated, it is possible to 
calculate discriminant scores for each observation in the samples, or any firm, and to 
assign the observations to one of the groups based on this score.  The essence of the 
procedure is to compare the profile of an individual firm with that of the alternative 
groupings (distressed or non-distressed). 
Testing the Model on Subsequent Distressed Firm Samples 
 In subsequent tests we examined 86 distressed companies from 1969-1975, 110 
bankrupts from 1976-1995 and 120 bankrupts from 1997-1999.  We found that the Z-
Score model, using a cutoff score of 2.675, was between 82% and 96% accurate (see 
Figure 3).  In repeated tests, the accuracy of the Z-Score model on samples of distressed 
firms has been in the vicinity of 80-90%, based on data from one financial reporting 
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period prior to bankruptcy.  The Type II error (classifying the firm as distressed when it 
does not go bankrupt or defaults), however, has increased substantially in recent years 
with as much as 25% of all firms having Z-Scores below 1.81.  Using the lower bound of 
the zone-of-ignorance (1.81) gives a more realistic cutoff Z-Score than the 2.675, 
although the latter resulted in the lowest overall error in the original tests.  The model 
was 100% accurate when scores were below 1.81 or above 2.99. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Classification & Prediction Accuracy 
Z-Score (1968) Credit Scoring Model* 
 
 
Year Prior 
To Failure 
 
Original 
Sample (33) 
 
Holdout 
Sample (25) 
1969-1975 
Predictive 
Sample (86) 
1976-1995 
Predictive 
Sample (110) 
1997-1999 
Predictive 
Sample (120)
 
1 94% (88%) 96% (92%) 82% (75%) 85% (78%) 94% (84%) 
2 72% 80% 68% 75% 74% 
 
*Using 2.67 as cutoff score (1.81 cutoff accuracy in parenthesis) 
 
6. Adaptation for Private Firms’ Application 
 One of the most frequent inquiries is “What should we do to apply the model to 
firms in the private sector?”  Credit analysts, private placement dealers, accounting 
auditors, and firms themselves are concerned that the original model is only applicable to 
publicly traded entities (since X4 requires stock price data).  And, to be perfectly correct, 
the Z-Score model is a publicly traded firm model and ad hoc adjustments are not 
scientifically valid.  For example, the most obvious modification is to substitute the book 
value of equity for the market value.   
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7. A Revised Z-Score Model 
 Rather than simply insert a proxy variable into an existing model to accommodate 
private firms, we advocate a complete reestimation of the model, substituting the book 
values of equity for the Market Value in X4.  One expects that all of the coefficients will 
change (not only the new variable’s parameter) and that the classification criterion and 
related cutoff scores would also change.  That is exactly what happens. 
 The result of our revised Z-Score model with a new X4 variable is: 
 Z’ = 0.717(X1) + 0.847(X2) + 3.107(X3) + 0.420(X4) + 0.998(X5) 
The equation now looks somewhat different than the earlier model.  Note, for instance, 
the coefficient for X1 went from 1.2 to 0.7.  But the model still looks quite similar to the 
one using the market value of equity.   
8. Bond Rating Equivalents  
 One of the main reasons for building a credit-scoring model is to estimate the 
probability of default and loss given a certain level of risk estimation.5  Although we all 
are aware that the rating agencies (e.g., Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch) are certainly not 
perfect in their credit risk assessments, in general it is felt that they do provide important 
and consistent estimates of default - mainly through their ratings.  In addition, since there 
has been a long history and fairly large number of defaults which had ratings, especially 
in the United States, we can “profit” from this history by linking our credit scores with 
these ratings and thereby deriving expected and unexpected PDs and perhaps LGDs.  
These estimates can be made for a fixed period of time from the rating date, e.g., one 
year, or on a cumulative basis over some investment horizon, e.g., five years.  They can 
                                                 
5 Indeed, Basel II’s Foundation and Advanced Internal Rating Based Approaches require that these 
estimates be made based on the bank’s or capital market experience 
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be derived from the rating agencies calculations, that is, from the so-called “static-pool” 
(S&P) or “dynamic-cohort” (Moody’s) approaches.  An alternative is to use Altman’s 
[1989] mortality rate approach (updated annually) which is based on the expected default 
from the original issuance date and its associated rating. 
 With respect to nonrated entities, one can calculate a score, based on some 
available model, and perhaps link it to a bond rating equivalent.  The latter then can lead 
to the estimate of PD.  For example, in Figure 4 we list the bond rating equivalents for 
various Z-Score intervals based on average Z-Scores from 1995-1999 for bonds rated in 
their respective categories.  One observes that triple-A bonds have an average Z-Score of 
about 5.0, while singe-B bonds have an average score of 1.70 (in the distressed zone).   
The analyst can then observe the average one year PD from Moody’s/S&P for B 
rated bonds and find that it is in the 5% - 6% range (Moody’s [2002], S&P [2002]), or 
that the average PD one year after issuance is 2.45% (Altman and Arman, [2002]).  Note 
that our mortality rate’s first year’s PD is considerably lower that the PD derived from a 
“basket” of Moody’s/S&P B rated bonds which contain securities of many different ages 
and maturities.  We caution the analyst to apply the correct PD estimate based on the 
qualities of the relevant portfolio of credit assets. 
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Figure 4 
 
Average Z-Scores by S&P Bond Rating 
1995 – 1999 
 Average Annual 
Number of Firms 
 
Average 
Z-Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BB 
B 
CCC 
 
11 
46 
131 
107 
50 
80 
10 
 
 
5.02 
4.30 
3.60 
2.78 
2.45 
1.67 
0.95 
 
1.50 
1.81 
2.26 
1.50 
1.62 
1.22 
1.10 
Source:  Compustat Data Tapes, 1995-1999. 
 
9. A Further Revision – Adapting the Model for Non-Manufacturers and  
Emerging Markets  
 
The next modification of the Z-Score model assesses the characteristics and 
accuracy of a model without X5 - sales/total assets.  We do this in order to minimize the 
potential industry effect that is more likely to take place when such an industry-sensitive 
variable as asset turnover is included.  In addition, we have used this model to assess the 
financial health of non-U.S. corporates.  In particular, Altman, Hartzell and Peck [1995, 
1997] have applied this enhanced Z" Score model to emerging markets corporates, 
specifically Mexican firms that had issued Eurobonds denominated in US dollars.  The 
book value of equity was used for X4 in this case. 
 The classification results are identical to the revised (Z’ Score) five-variable 
model.  The new Z” Score model is: 
 Z” = 6.56 (X1) + 3.26 (X2) + 6.72 (X3) + 1.05 (X4) 
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Where Z”-Scores below 1.10 indicate a distressed condition. 
All of the coefficients for variables X1 to X4 are changed as are the group means 
and cutoff scores.  In the emerging market (EM) model, we added a constant term of 
+3.25 so as to standardize the scores with a score of zero (0) equated to a D (default) 
rated bond.  See Figure 5 for the bond rating equivalents of the scores in this model.  We 
believe this model is more appropriate for non-manufacturers than is the original Z-Score 
model.  Of course, models developed for specific industries, e.g., retailers, telecoms, etc. 
are an even better method for assessing distress potential of like-industry firms. 
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Figure 5 
US Bond Rating Equivalent Based on EM Score 
Z”=3.25 + 6.56 (X1) + 3.26 (X2) + 6.72 (X3) + 1.05 (X4) 
US Equivalent Rating Average EM Score 
AAA 
AA+ 
AA 
AA- 
A+ 
A 
A- 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB- 
BB+ 
BB 
BB- 
B+ 
B 
B- 
CCC+ 
CCC 
CCC- 
D 
 
8.15 
7.60 
7.30 
7.00 
6.85 
6.65 
6.40 
6.25 
5.85 
5.65 
5.25 
4.95 
4.75 
4.50 
4.15 
3.75 
3.20 
2.50 
1.75 
0 
Source: In-Depth Data Corp.; average based on more than 750 U.S. Corporates with rated debt 
outstanding: 1995 data.  
 
10. Macro Economic Impact and Loss Estimation 
 All of the aforementioned models are, in a sense, static in nature in that they can 
be applied at any point in time regardless of the current or expected performance of the 
economy and the economy’s impact on the key risk measures: (1) Probability of Default 
(PDs), and (2) Loss Given Default (LGDs).  Aggregate PDs vary over time so that a firm 
with a certain set of variables will fail more frequently in poor economic times and vice-
versa in good periods.  This systematic factor is not incorporated directly in the 
establishment of scoring models in most cases.  Some recent attempts have included 
experimenting with variables which can capture these exogenous factors - like GDP 
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growth.  Since GDP growth will be the same for the good firms as well as the distressed 
ones in the model development phase, it is necessary to be creative in including macro-
impact variables.  One idea is to add an aggregate default measure for each year to 
capture a high or low risk environment and observe its explanatory power contribution in 
the failure classification model.  Such attempts have only achieved modest success to 
date.  An alternative structure is to assign prior probabilities of group membership (for 
examples, default/ non-default), as well as costs of errors, to determine optimal cutoff 
scores in the model (see Altman, et al. (1977) for a discussion of this technique). 
11. Loss Given Default Estimates (Default Recoveries) 
 Most modern credit risk models and all of the VaR models (e.g., CreditMetrics), 
assume independence between PD and the recovery rate on defaulted debt.  Altman, 
Brady, Resti and Sironi [2002] however, show that this is an incorrect assumption and 
simulate the impact on capital requirements when you factor in a significant negative 
correlation between PD and recovery rates over time.  In particular, the authors found that 
in periods of high default rates on bonds, the recovery rate is low relative to the average 
and losses can be expected to be greater (e.g., in 2000 and 2001) when bond recoveries 
(prices just after default) were 26.4% and 25.5%, respectively (Altman and Arman, 
2002).  Hu and Perraudin [2002] find similar results and Frye [2000] specified a 
systematic macro-economic influence on recovery rates.  This has caused serious concern 
among some central bankers of the potential procyclicality of a rating based approach, 
which is the approach being recommended by Basel II.  In addition, investors in risky 
corporate debt and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) need to be aware that 
recoveries will usually be lower in high default periods. 
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 Basel II, however, has made a real contribution by motivating an enormous 
amount of effort on the part of banks (and regulators) to build (evaluate) credit risk 
models that involve scoring techniques, default and loss estimates, and portfolio 
approaches to the credit risk problem.  We now turn to an alternative approach to the Z-
Score type models. 
12. The Expected Default Frequency (EDF) Model 
 KMV Corporation, purchased by Moody’s in 2002, has developed a procedure for 
estimating the default probability of a firm that is based conceptually on Merton’s [1974] 
option-theoretic, zero-coupon, corporate bond valuation approach. The starting point of 
the KMV model is the proposition that when the market value of a firm drops below a 
certain liability level, the firm will default on its obligations.  The value of the firm, 
projected to a given future date, has a probability distribution characterized by its 
expected value and standard deviation (volatility).  The area under the distribution that is 
below the book liabilities of the firm is the PD, called the EDF .  In three steps, the model 
determines an EDF for a company.  In the first step, the market value and volatility of the 
firm are estimated from the market value of its stock, the volatility of its stock, and the 
book value of its liabilities.  In the second step, the firm’s default point is calculated 
relative to the firm’s liabilities coming due over time.  A measure is constructed that 
represents the number of standard deviations from the expected firm value to the default 
point (the distance to default).  Finally, a mapping is determined between a firm’s 
distance to default and the default rate probability based on the historical default 
experience of companies with similar distance-to-default values. 
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 In the case of private companies, for which stock price and default data are 
generally unavailable, KMV estimates the value and volatility of the private firm directly 
from its observed characteristics and values based on market comparables, in lieu of 
market values on the firm’s securities. 
 For a firm with publicly traded shares, the market value of equity may be 
observed.  The market value of equity may be expressed as the value of a call option as 
follows: 
 Market value of equity = f (book value of liabilities, 
            market value of assets,    
            volatility of assets, time horizon) 
 Next, the expected asset value at the horizon and the default point are determined.  
An investor holding the asset would expect to get a payout plus a capital gain equal to the 
expected return.  Using a measure of the asset’s systematic risk, KMV determines an 
expected return based upon historic asset market returns.  This is reduced by the payout 
rate determined from the firm’s interest and dividend payments.  The result is the 
expected appreciation rate, which when applied to the current asset value, gives the 
expected future value of the assets.  It was assumed that the firm would default when its 
total market value falls below the book value of its liabilities.  Based upon empirical 
analysis of defaults, KMV has found that the most frequent default point is at a firm 
value approximately equal to current liabilities plus 50% of long-term liabilities (25% 
was first tried, but did not work well). 
 Given the firm’s expected value at the horizon, and its default point at the 
horizon, KMV determines the percentage drop in the firm value that would bring it to the 
default point.  By dividing the percentage drop by the volatility, KMV controls for the 
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effect of different volatilities.  The number of standard deviations that the asset value 
must drop in order to reach the default point is called the distance to default 
 The distance-to-default metric is a normalized measure and thus may be used for 
comparing one company with another.  A key assumption of the KMV approach is that 
all the relevant information for determining relative default risk is contained in the 
expected market value of assets, the default point, and the asset volatility.  Differences 
because of industry, national location, size, and so forth are assumed to be included in 
these measures, notably the asset volatility. 
 Distance to default is also an ordinal measure akin to a bond rating, but it still 
does not tell you what the default probability is.  To extend this risk measure to a cardinal 
or a probability measure, KMV uses historical default experience to determine an 
expected default frequency as a function of distance to default.  It does this by comparing 
the calculated distances to default and the observed actual default rate for a large number 
of firms from their proprietary database.  A smooth curve fitted to those data yields the 
EDF as a function of the distance to default.  
11. The Enron Example: Models Versus Ratings 
 We have examined two of the more popularly found credit scoring models - the 
Z-Score model and KMV’s EDF - and in both cases a bond rating equivalent can be 
assigned to a firm.  Many commentators have noted that quantitative credit risk 
measurement tools can save banks and other “investors” from losing substantial amounts 
or at least reducing their risk exposures.  A prime example is the recent Enron debacle, 
whereby billions of dollars of equity and debt capital have been lost.  The following 
illustrates the potential savings involved from a disciplined credit risk procedure. 
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 On December 2, 2001, Enron Corporation filed for protection under Chapter 11 
and became the largest corporate bankruptcy (at that time) in U.S. history - with reported 
liabilities at the filing of more than $31 billion and off-balance sheet liabilities bringing 
the total to over $60 billion!  Using data that was available to investors over the period 
1997-2001, Figure 6 (from Saunders and Allen [2002]) shows the following: KMV’s 
EDF, with its heavy emphasis on Enron’s stock price, rated Enron AAA as of year-end 
1999, but then indicated a fairly consistent rating equivalent deterioration resulting in a 
BBB rating one year later and then a B- to CCC+ rating just prior to the filing.  Our 
Z”Score model (the four variable model for non-manufacturers) had Enron as BBB as of 
year-end 1999 - the same as the rating agencies - but then showed a steady deterioration 
to B as of June 2001.  So, both quantitative tools were issuing a warning long before the 
bad news hit the market.  Although neither actually predicted the bankruptcy, these tools 
certainly could have provided an unambiguous early warning that the rating agencies 
were not providing (their ratings remained at BBB until just before the bankruptcy).  
Both models were using a vast under-estimate of the true liabilities of the firm.  If we use 
the true liabilities of about $60 billion, both models would have predicted severe distress.  
To be fair, the rating agencies were constrained in that a downrating from BBB could 
have been the death-knell for a firm like Enron which relied on its all important 
investment grade rating in its vast counterparty trading and structured finance 
transactions.  An objective model, based solely on publicly available accounting and 
market information, is not constrained in that the analyst is free to follow the signal or to 
be motivated to dig-deeper into what on the surface may appear to be a benign situation. 
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Figure 6
Source:     Saunders & Allen [2002]. 
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WorldCom – A Case of Huge Indirect Bankruptcy Costs 
 A second high-profile bankruptcy that we have applied the two credit scoring 
models to is WorldCom—the largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy in our nation’s history with 
over $43 billion of liabilities at the time of filing.  WorldCom, one of the many high 
flying telecommunications firms that have succumbed to bankruptcy in the last few years, 
but one with substantial real assets, was downgraded from it’s A- rating to BBB+ in 2001 
and then to “junk” status in May 2002, finally succumbing shortly thereafter and filing 
for bankruptcy protection in mid-July. 
 We performed several tests on WorldCom including the Z”-Score (four variable 
model) which is more appropriate for non-manufacturers and the KMV-EDF risk 
measure.  The Z-Score tests were done on the basis of three sets of financials: (1) the 
unadjusted statements available to the public before the revelations of massive 
understatements of earnings and the write-offs of goodwill, (2) adjusted for the first 
acknowledgement of $3.85 billion of inflated profits in 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 
and (3) adjusted for a further write-off of $3.3 billion and a massive write-off of $50 
billion in assets (goodwill).  These results are shown in Figure 7. 
 Our results show that the Z”-Score (using unadjusted data) was 1.50 (4.75 with 
the constant term of 3.25 added to get our bond equivalent score [BES]) at the end of 
2000.  This translates to a BB- rating.  The EDF measure as of year-end 2000 was 
equivalent to BBB-/BB+.  At that time, the actual S&P rating was A-.  The BES 
remained essentially the same, or even improved a bit, throughout 2001, as did the EDF, 
when the rating agencies began to downgrade the company to BBB+.  At the end of Q1-
2002, the last financials available before its bankruptcy, WorldCom’s Z”-Score was 1.66 
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(4.91 BES) and it remained a BB- Bond equivalent.  The EDF rose and its rating 
equivalent also fell to about BB- by March 2002 and continued to drop to CCC/CC by 
June, when the S&P rating dropped to BB and then to CCC just before default.  So, while 
both models were indicating a non-investment grade company as much as 18 months 
before the actual downgrade to non-investment grade and its eventual bankruptcy, we 
would not have predicted its total demise based on the available financials.  But it did go 
under, primarily because of the fraud revelations and its attendant costs due to the loss of 
credit availability.  We refer to these “costs” as indirect bankruptcy costs, usually 
associated with the public’s awareness of a substantial increase in default probability (see 
Altman, 1984).  This is a classic case of the potential enormous impact of these hard-to-
quantify costs and is a clear example of where the expected costs of bankruptcy 
overwhelm the expected tax benefits from the debt. 
 Under the second scenario, we reduce earnings, assets and net worth by $3.85 
billion over the five quarters ending the first quarter of 2002.  The resulting Z”-Score was 
1.36 (4.61 BES) as of year-end 2001 – a B+ bond equivalent – and 4.55 as of Q1-2002 - 
again a B+ equivalent.6  While the revised rating equivalent is lower, we still would not 
have predicted WorldCom to go bankrupt, even with the adjusted financials. 
 After adjusting for the “second installment” of improper accounting of profits and 
a massive write-off of goodwill,7 the resulting bond rating equivalent is now lower 
(CCC+) but still not in the default zone. 
                                                 
6 WorldCom’s Z-Score (original five-variable model) was 1.7 as of Q1-2002, a B rating equivalent, but in 
the distress zone. 
 
7 Actually, the Z-Score models should only consider tangible assets, so the goodwill should not, in a strict 
sense, have been considered even in the unadjusted cases. 
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Figure 7
*BEQ = Z" Score Bond Equivalent Rating
Sources: Compilation by the author (E. Altman, NYU Stern), the KMV 
(Moody's) Website and Standard & Poor's Corporation.
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14. Conclusion 
In the Enron and WorldCom cases, and many others that we are aware of, 
although tools like Z-Score and EDF were available, losses were still incurred by even 
the most sophisticated investors and financial institutions.  Having the models is simply 
not enough!  What is needed is a “credit-culture” within these financial institutions, 
whereby credit risk tools are “listened-to” and evaluated in good times as well as in 
difficult situations.  And, to repeat an important caveat, credit scoring models should not 
be the only analytical process used in credit decisions.  The analyst will, however, when 
the indications warrant, be motivated to consider or re-evaluate a situation when 
traditional techniques have not clearly indicated a distressed situation. 
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